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Abstract 
The Open and Trusted Health Information Systems 
(OTHIS) Research Group has formed in response to the 
health sector’s privacy and security requirements for 
contemporary Health Information Systems (HIS). Due to 
recent research developments in trusted computing 
concepts, it is now both timely and desirable to move 
electronic HIS towards privacy-aware and security-aware 
applications. We introduce the OTHIS architecture in this 
paper. This scheme proposes a feasible and sustainable 
solution to meeting real-world application security 
demands using commercial off-the-shelf systems and 
commodity hardware and software products
.
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1 Background 
The OTHIS Research Group at the Information Security 
Institute (ISI) in the Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT) has been recently formed in response 
to industry need for systems expertise in contemporary 
Health Information Systems (HIS). The Group’s vision is 
to bring together system and network researchers, 
application domain specialists, and security specialists to 
contribute to the design, development and enhancement 
of a trusted framework for the protection of sensitive 
health data in HIS.  Currently the OTHIS Research Group 
is chaired by Emeritus Professor William (Bill) Caelli, 
AO. The Group has already been successful in defining 
and developing an overall trust architecture based around 
identification of the separate domains of concern. 
Preliminary results have been published (Liu, Caelli and 
May 2006; Croll, Henricksen, Caelli and Liu 2007; 
Henricksen, Caelli and Croll 2007; Liu, Caelli, May and 
Croll 2007; Liu, Caelli, May, Croll and Henricksen 2007; 
Franco, Sahama and Croll 2008; Liu, Caelli, May and 
Croll 2008b; Liu, Caelli, May and Croll 2008a).  
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2 Paper Structure 
Section 3 introduces the concepts of privacy and security 
in HIS and aligns security requirements for HIS with 
more general goals and initiatives. The authors’ proposal 
for a secure and open e-health architecture is overviewed 
in Section 4. Sections 5, 6 and 7 discuss the components 
of this architecture. Future work is outlined in Section 8. 
3 Introduction 
As a general principle privacy and security of individual 
patient data is paramount. In the real world the challenge 
is to carry this principle through to HIS implementations. 
The primary goal of the OTHIS Research Group, 
therefore, is to promote an architecture that provides 
guidance for technical and security design appropriate to 
the development and implementation of trusted HIS. This 
research provides a sufficiently rich set of security 
controls that satisfy the breadth and depth of security 
requirements for HIS whilst simultaneously offering 
guidance to ongoing research projects.  In order to meet 
real-world application security demands that are 
understandable, implementable and usable, our research 
themes embrace reasonable security strategies against 
economic realities using commercial off-the-shelf 
systems and commodity hardware and software products. 
Our research team continues to focus on architectural 
implementation activities around the OTHIS scheme in 
order to address security requirements at all levels in HIS. 
The team’s future research work will implement and 
verify the practicality of the OTHIS scheme to a real HIS 
in partnership with a number of medical institutes.  
3.1 The Need for Trusted HIS 
Social, political and legal imperatives are emerging 
worldwide for the enhancement of privacy and security in 
health information systems. A high level of “information 
assurance” is now accepted as the necessary baseline for 
the establishment and maintenance of both current and 
future HIS. A security violation in HIS, such as an 
unauthorised disclosure or unauthorised alteration of 
individual health information, has the potential for 
disaster among healthcare providers and consumers. In a 
separate paper (Liu et al., 2007) three such real-world 
scenarios (from Australia, UK and the USA) are 
identified and analysed from a security and sustainability 
perspective. Although the concept of Electronic Health 
Records has much potential for improving the processing 
of health data, electronic health records may inadvertently 
pose new threats for compromising sensitive personal 
health data if not designed and managed effectively. 
Indeed malevolent motivations could feasibly disclose 
confidential personal health information on a more 
widespread scale (potentially massive) and at a higher 
speed than possible with traditional paper-based medical 
records. There is also the factor of the healthcare service 
providers’ willingness to accept and adopt a new 
technology that does not always facilitate efficient 
working practices. To encourage healthcare service 
consumers and providers to use electronic health records, 
it is crucial to instil confidence that the electronic health 
information is well protected and that consumers' privacy 
is assured. 
3.2 General Health Information Systems 
A generic modern HIS architecture normally consists of a 
number of structures at various levels in computer 
hardware, firmware, operating system design and 
facilities, network management system, middleware, 
database management system and healthcare applications 
as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: General HIS Structure 
Unfortunately, many application users wrongly believe 
that they have sophisticated security at that particular 
level since their applications provide a form of message 
level protection or equivalent. It should be understood 
that no matter what security measures are supported at the 
application level they are only ever going to be 
superficial to the knowledgeable adversary or malicious 
insider. A significant limitation in this scenario is that the 
overall application system can be no more secure than the 
software libraries invoked and incorporated into it, as 
well as the underlying Web Services upon which the 
applications depend through such internal actions as 
systems calls, dynamic library activation, use of 
intermediate code interpreters such as “JavaScript” or 
“just-in-time” compilers, etc. The Web Services itself can 
be no more secure than the firmware and hardware 
facilities of the computer on which it operates. Likewise, 
any other software component set, such as “middleware”, 
database management system, network interface structure 
or “stack”, is constructed above the Web Services and so 
totally depends upon security functions provided by the 
Web Services as well as the robustness of that Web 
Services against attack. Healthcare applications can be 
secure and trusted only when the underlying operating 
system is secure and trusted.  
3.3 Australian national e-health initiatives 
The National E-health Transition Authority (NEHTA) 
gives direction on developing e-health implementations 
for the Australian environment. NEHTA recommends a 
Service Oriented Architecture and Web Services 
approach to healthcare application systems (NEHTA 
2005). This is recognised as best practice for scalable 
distributed systems today. 
NEHTA work programs for an e-health 
interoperability framework include Clinical Information, 
Medicine Product Directory, Supply Chain Efficiency, e-
Health Policy, Clinical Terminologies, Individual 
Healthcare Identifiers, Healthcare Provider Identifiers, 
Secure Messaging, User Authentication and Shared 
Electronic Health Record Specifications.  
NEHTA focuses on exchanging clinical information 
by electronic means securely and reliably at the HIS 
application level. A limitation of this Web Services 
approach is that security is restricted to the application 
level only. This is the highest level depicted in Figure 1. 
Three real-world scenarios, where privacy and security 
breaches and weaknesses occur external to the application 
level, are given in Liu et al. (2007). A complete 
architecture is needed, therefore, and not one that 
involves just a secure messaging system alone. OTHIS 
addresses the privacy protection and security for health 
systems in a holistic and “end-to-end” manner. This 
incorporates more than just the high-level application 
layer. The OTHIS architecture also complements existing 
work already evident in related HIS security areas. 
 
4 Proposed Architecture - OTHIS 
In order to achieve a high level of information assurance 
in HIS, we propose a new approach to a more trusted 
scheme, the Open and Trusted Health Information 
Systems (OTHIS). The goal of OTHIS is to address 
privacy and security requirements at each level within a 
modern HIS architecture to ensure the protection of data 
from both internal and external threats. OTHIS also has 
the capability of providing conformance of any HIS to 
appropriate regulatory and legal requirements. Its primary 
emphasis in this paper is on the Australian health sector. 
4.1 OTHIS is an Open Approach  
In line with contemporary information technology 
concepts of open source and open architecture, OTHIS 
incorporates the term “open”. In order to embrace 
emerging open architecture, standard and open source 
technologies are used rather than proprietary 
technologies. This allows the architecture to be publicly 
accessible, providing a platform for interoperability. 
Normally HIS are based around open and distributed 
network systems. It is therefore entirely appropriate to 
relate OTHIS to international standards such as Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) security architecture (ISO 
7498-2 and ISO/IEO7498-4). This research adopts the 
broad architectural concepts as proposed in those 
standards and as adopted for some time by national 
governments via “Government OSI Profiles”.  
4.2 OTHIS Builds upon Trusted Systems 
Aligned with the concept of trust in information systems, 
OTHIS also incorporates the term “trusted system”. Any 
information system depends upon its basic architecture 
for its general operation. Any trusted information system 
depends, therefore, upon a trusted base for safe and 
reliable operation, commonly referred to as a “trusted 
computing-base”. Without a trusted computing base any 
system is subject to compromise. In particular, data 
security at the application level can be assured only when 
the healthcare application is operating on top of the 
trusted computing base platform. Threats to the security 
of healthcare applications can be either externally or 
internally sourced. In the case of an external threat, an 
adversary can exploit illicit means to perform actions that 
bypass or disable the security features of healthcare 
applications or that grant inappropriate access privileges. 
In the case of an internal threat, if the HIS is not 
internally robust authorised users can inadvertently 
compromise the system. This is a commonplace scenario. 
Inevitably healthcare applications or databases must be 
executed upon a trusted platform in order to achieve 
adequate information assurance. For this reason OTHIS 
aims at running on top of trusted firmware and hardware 
bases.   
4.3 OTHIS is a Modularised Structure 
Appropriate data security management involves the 
protection of data in storage, during processing, and 
during transmission. The proposed OTHIS structure 
(Figure 2) addresses all these areas. It consists of three 
distinct modules: 
 Health Informatics Access Control (HIAC), 
 Health Informatics Application Security (HIAS), 
and 
 Health Informatics Network Security (HINS). 
OTHIS is a modularised architecture for HIS. It is 
divided into separate and achievable function-based 
modules. The advantage of the modularisation is that 
each module is easier to manage and maintain. One 
module can be changed without affecting the other 
module. OTHIS is, thus, a broad architecture covering 
those requirements and parts that may be selected as 
required to meet particular circumstances. Although there 
is some overlap across the modules, each module has a 
specific focus area. HIAC is data-centric dealing with 
information at rest. HIAS is process-centric dealing with 
information under processing. HINS is transfer-centric 
dealing with information under transfer.  Trust in network 
operations through HINS rests completely upon trust in 
HIAS and HIAC, otherwise the security of messaging 
becomes futile. 
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Figure 2: Modularised Structure of OTHIS 
5 Health Informatics Access Control (HIAC) 
“Access control” simply refers to a set of rules that 
specify which users can access what resources with 
particular types of access restrictions. Various Web 
Services, network management systems and database 
management system can employ a choice of access 
control mechanisms to grant users access to protected 
resources of the system. Controlling appropriate access to 
data in any information system is a major security issue. 
Many instances of poor access control management 
practices leading to security and privacy violations are 
reported on a regular basis (Liu, Caelli, May and Croll 
2007).  
5.1 Access Control Models 
Discretionary access control essentially assigns 
responsibility for all security parameters of a data 
resource to the “owner” (user), usually the data resource 
creator, who can pass on such parameters to others and 
perform functions as desired in an unrestricted manner. 
Role based access control refines the concept to allow for 
users to be grouped into defined functions or “roles” 
enabling easier management of overall system security 
policy particularly in dynamic business environments. 
Mandatory access control (MAC), in principle, enforces 
security policy as set out by the overall enterprise and not 
set up by the data resource “owner”.  The traditional 
MAC policy was originally designed for a military 
environment. It was based on the multi-level security 
policy hierarchical structure and was quite rigid in its 
application. More recent research has modernised the 
traditional MAC approach to a flexible form of MAC 
(Flexible MAC) that overcomes traditional MAC 
limitations. Flexible MAC provides a balance of security 
needs and flexibility of implementation that allows the 
security policy to be modified, customised and extended 
as required in line with normal application and system 
requirements. The OTHIS/HIAC model is Flexible MAC-
based accompanied by Role Based Access Control 
administration properties for flexibility and a refined 
level of granularity. This degree of simultaneous control 
and flexibility is not achievable with Discretionary 
Access Control, Role Based Access Control or MAC 
individually. 
OTHIS/HIAC proposes a viable solution to provide 
appropriate levels of secure access control for the 
protection of sensitive health data. Increasingly, HIS are 
being developed and deployed based upon commercial, 
commodity-level information and communications 
technology products and systems. Such general-purpose 
systems have been created over the last twenty-five years, 
often with only minimal security functionality and 
verification. In particular access control, a vital security 
function in any Web Services that forms the basis for 
application packages, has been founded upon earlier 
designs based on Discretionary Access Control. 
Discretionary Access Control systems were defined 
around an environment where data and program resources 
were developed and deployed within a single enterprise, 
assuming implicit trust amongst users. This 
environmental model is no longer valid for modern HIS. 
In some commercial systems, for example, even the 
addition of a simple single printer unit has the capacity to 
seriously undermine the overall integrity of the 
information system.  
5.2 Granularity in the HIAC Model 
While privacy and security requirements directly relate to 
identifiable data and information, a far finer level of 
granularity is needed for security and control 
management requirements of a real HIS. Not only does 
HIAC enforce access controls on data files and file 
directories within the trusted Web Services level, it also 
provides access control at the {data element, database 
table}, {row/column}, and cell level views. This can 
reduce the maintenance cost of managing security at the 
application level. 
5.3 Viability of an HIAC model  
To determine the practical viability of an HIAC model for 
HIS a demonstrator, based on a “Security Enhanced 
Linux (SELinux)” computer platform (“Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux version 4”), was built  (Henricksen, 
Caelli and Croll 2007). This work was carried out at the 
primitive stage of SELinux project development. As 
SELinux continues to advance and evolve, our research to 
date has modernised our HIAC demonstrator (Martin 
Franco 2008). Preliminary results of this research indicate 
that the broad philosophy of Flexible MAC appears 
ideally suited to the protection of the healthcare 
information systems environment. 
6 Health Informatics Application Security 
(HIAS)  
The overall aim of the OTHIS/HIAS model is to address 
the data protection requirements at the application level in 
HIS. HIAS is located at the OSI’s “Application Layer”, 
Layer 7, to provide security features which are often 
required by a healthcare application at a data element 
level through to a service level. While privacy and 
security requirements directly relate to identifiable data 
and information, those HIS elements sitting at higher 
level information system layers cannot be ignored. 
6.1 HIAS Legal Compliance  
HIAS addresses enterprise policies, and legislative and 
regulatory requirements, as well as growing social and 
political demands relevant to the implementation of 
security controls in HIS with a primary emphasis on the 
Australian health sector.  Based on a Flexible MAC-
based concept, OTHIS/HIAS proposes a feasible and 
reliable solution for the protection of sensitive health 
data. It satisfies legislative, regulatory and organisational 
policy requirements for both healthcare providers and 
healthcare consumers, as well as providing the flexibility 
to meet operational demands in HIS. This concept is 
entirely pertinent to the recent e-health privacy blueprint 
(Australian Government Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner 2008) proposed by the Australian 
Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, which 
requests specific enabling legislation in order to protect 
sensitive health data. Such legislative support is crucial 
for the proposed national Individual Electronic Health 
Record systems to be a successful implementation. The 
objective of the legislation is to gain the trust and 
confidence of individuals in the Individual Electronic 
Health Record system.  
It must be noted, however, that not all individuals have 
trust and confidence in the overall management of their 
health records or in the associated information systems 
used by healthcare providers. To instil an individual’s 
trust and confidence, it is critical to ensure that electronic 
health information is maintained appropriately, and that 
any such security measures are understood and accepted 
by an individual and by society at large. OTHIS/HIAS 
proposes a Flexible MAC-based scheme for the 
development of a reliable and sustainable Individual 
Electronic Health Record system against misuse, 
disclosure and unauthorised access. This is reinforced by 
the assertion of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
(Australian Government Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner 2008) and NEHTA1 (2008). They argue 
that it is necessary to have the “sensitivity label” 
mechanism in place in the design of a national approach 
to Individual Electronic Health Record in order to enable 
individuals and their health providers to have the 
appropriate level of access they are permitted to have on 
sensitive health data. 
6.2 Web Services Security in the HIAS Model  
Web Services and Service-Oriented Architecture 
concepts and implementations are proliferating. The Web 
Services application model promises to add functional 
and assessment complexities to the overall information 
assurance problem by weaving separate components 
together over the Internet to deliver application services 
through such methodologies as software “mashups” and 
the like. These techniques place full trust in the 
underlying components that are combined into the overall 
system in a situation where the provenance of those 
underlying components may not be known. 
NEHTA recommends using an Service Oriented 
Architecture approach to the design of healthcare 
application systems and the use of “Web Services” as the 
technology standards for implementing secure messaging 
systems (NEHTA 2005). NEHTA argues that 
development of information systems around Web 
Services technology is the direction in which the 
information and communications technology industry is 
heading as well as being accepted as best practice for the 
design of scalable distributed systems today. The Service 
Oriented Architecture approach is claimed to lead to more 
reusable, adaptable and extensible systems over other 
techniques. In particular, NEHTA supports the concept 
that Web Services technology has gained notable 
attention within the information and communications 
technology industry and its use is extending in both 
popularity and market penetration. 
The Web Services technology can incorporate security 
features in the application layer, for example the label 
“WS-Security” in the header of a “Simple Object Access 
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  The National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) 
has been established to accelerate the adoption of e-health 
by supporting the process of reform in the Australian 
health sector.  
Protocol” XML message.  WS-Security provides a set of 
mechanisms to maintain finer granular levels of security 
services such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation at an element level.  For example, 
WS-security defines how to use XML Encryption and 
XML Signature processes in the Simple Object Access 
Protocol to secure message exchanges.  Moreover, Web 
Services is a series of open standards intended to support 
interoperability in an environment where separate 
applications need to share information over an open 
network.  As such, any healthcare security architecture 
must be capable of handling the Web Services paradigm 
in a trusted, secure and efficient manner.   
OTHIS/HIAS also addresses the situation where Web 
Services structures are being used as the major health 
informatics information transport methodology.  OTHIS 
recognises that the Service Oriented Architecture 
approach, implemented through a Web Services structure, 
has become a major information architecture paradigm.  
As such, any healthcare security architecture must be 
capable of handling the Web Services paradigm in a 
trusted, secure and efficient manner. This, however, 
provides end-to-end security for data and messages in 
transit but depends upon an underlying trusted system 
that supports Flexible MAC principles.   
6.3 Health Level 7 in the HIAS Model  
In developing a trusted system architecture for an HIS, it 
is important to understand the philosophy of Health Level 
7 for medical data transfer. Health Level 7, an American 
National Standards Institute accredited standard, has been 
developed to enable disparate healthcare applications to 
exchange key sets of clinical and administrative data. 
With respect to the Health Level 7 structure, HIAS 
depends upon the use of cryptographic subsystems as its 
security mechanism. Future research programs under 
OTHIS will elucidate the relationships between the broad 
Health Level 7 structure and that of OTHIS from an 
information assurance perspective. In particular, the focus 
is on the use of Health Level 7 for both communication 
and application security and privacy services as needed. 
It is necessary to determine which parts of the Health 
Level 7 standards set belong to either of, or both, HINS 
and HIAS. The problem of secure messaging structures, 
however, belongs to the HINS component (as will be 
described in a forthcoming paper). For example, Health 
Level 7 requires the use of “digital signatures”. Reliable 
digital signatures are expected to be created from 
subsystems within the computer Web Services, and also 
possibly specific computer hardware under which the HIS 
works. Without a trusted foundation, the data security of 
any health applications is inherently vulnerable.  
7 Health Informatics Network Security 
(HINS) 
HINS consists of the appropriate network level security 
structure within an underlying HIS. HINS is aimed at the 
provision of services and mechanisms to authenticate 
claims of identity, to provide appropriate authorisations 
(least privileges) following authentication, to prevent 
unauthorised access to shared health data, to protect the 
network from attacks, and to provide secure 
communications health data transmission over the 
associated data networks. The major function of HINS is 
the authentication of claimed identities throughout HIS. 
This includes not only all personnel but also all 
computing, data storage and computer peripherals such as 
printers, scanners and network interfaces. OTHIS/HINS 
involves the vital integration of network security 
protocols and associated data formats with the access 
control structures contained within an operating system 
and allied generic application systems of individual 
computer nodes.   
At the same time the OSI Presentation Layer, as 
envisaged in the HINS project, will enable 
cryptographically secured trusted paths to be created 
between applications at client and server levels in any 
Service Oriented Architecture environment. The 
combination of the SELinux/Flexible MAC structures 
with a clear identification of a new “Layer 6” structure 
stands at the centre of the HINS project to enable 
protection of health systems on an end-to-end basis. 
Under the HINS scheme, the new Layer 6 will also be 
managed in the usual way via the creation of essential 
Flexible MAC user authorisation “profiles” that will be 
introduced into a running system in a dynamic way in 
order to be enforced by the new layer. Users will be 
authenticated into a stated profile at the network level; 
that is, without connection to any specific health 
information server host. In this sense, an authenticated 
user will be able to present an authorisation vector to any 
allowed host in the approved network in such a way that 
the separation of such hosts will not be obvious to the 
end-user. 
The OTHIS/HINS project is currently under 
development. The broad system architecture is nearing 
completion. The connection of Flexible MAC 
“compliant” servers and network elements into the 
overall structure is being defined against stated health 
information system requirements. Progress so far has 
demonstrated the basic concept of a “presentation layer” 
style “stub” structure for use by common application 
packages.  
8 Conclusion and Future Work 
The concepts of privacy and security in HIS were 
introduced in Section 3 along with the alignment of 
security requirements for HIS with more general goals 
and initiatives. Section 4 overviewed the authors’ 
proposal for a secure and open e-health architecture. 
Components of this architecture are further detailed in 
Sections 5, 6 and 7. 
Our research indicates that an overall trusted HIS should 
implement security at all levels of its architecture to 
ensure the protection of personal privacy and security of 
electronic health information. From an information 
security perspective, we propose OTHIS for the overall 
HIS architecture. This comprises a set of complementary 
security architectures consisting of HIAC, HIAS and 
HINS.  This proposed OTHIS scheme will be tested 
through experimental structures created on trusted Web 
Services. Key research questions to be answered include 
those concerning both system efficiency and availability 
aspects of the proposed architecture. Preliminary results 
of this research indicate that the broad philosophy of 
Flexible MAC appears ideally suited to the protection of 
the healthcare information systems environment.   
We contend that it is both timely and desirable to 
move electronic HIS towards privacy-aware and security-
aware applications that reside atop a trusted computing-
based Web Services. Such systems have the real-world 
potential to satisfy all stakeholder requirements including 
modern information structures, organisational policies, 
legislative and regulatory requirements for both 
healthcare providers and healthcare consumers (privacy 
and security), and flexible operational demands in HIS. 
This paper emphasises the need for well-directed research 
into the application of inherent privacy- and security-
enhanced operating systems to provide viable, real-world 
trusted HIS. The OTHIS scheme has the potential to fulfil 
these requirements. Future work continues on the 
development of the other modules within the proposed 
OTHIS structure with the ultimate goals of maximum 
sustainability, flexibility, performance, manageability, 
ease-of-use and understanding, scalability and legal 
compliance in the healthcare environment. 
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